The most concerning flashpoint for U.S. security officials is Taiwan; an island located just 100 miles east of mainland China. Taiwan is roughly the same size as West Virginia; however, its location in the First Island Chain and booming production of semi-conductors makes it a vital economic chokepoint. Despite concern amongst many experts regarding provocation of China, the bell has yet to ring in the brawl between Washington and Beijing.
Why Taiwan Is So Critical
Due to Chinese Civil War legacies, Beijing regards Taiwan as a non-negotiable piece of Chinese territory. These histories remain central to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambition to reunite the island with the mainland, by force if necessary.
Geographically speaking, Taiwan is situated between three major shipping lanes: the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the Luzon Strait. Each of which provides access to the greater Pacific Ocean for commercial and military ships. Therefore, whoever has influence in Taiwan enjoys greater control of supply chains as well as navigational advantage in conflict.
Additionally, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces 90% of the world’s most advanced computer chips, which are foundational to statecraft in the modern context. These chips touch every part of our lives, from consumer electronics, to cars, MRI machines, artificial intelligence, and missile guidance systems.
TSMC’s dominance of the semi-conductor industry has powered technological modernization. However, it creates a dense bottleneck, which could become a cataclysmic issue in the event of Chinese invasion, naval blockade, or natural disaster.
The closest example of the effect of Chinese intervention in Taiwan in the context of international commerce is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Global stocks plummeted, commodity prices spiked, and inflation increased worldwide. Importantly, European countries slowly corrected energy prices created by Russian oil dependency by establishing new partnerships with the United States and Egypt, supplemented by natural gas diversification.
Such an adjustment is not an option for American policymakers when it comes to chips. The United States currently lacks the infrastructure, mines, and rare earth refinement capabilities required to meet domestic chip demand. Therefore, leaving Washington overly reliant on imports.
China also relies on chip imports; however, they have mastered the supporting industries. Due to the fact China is willing to ignore environmental and ethical concerns which constrain American companies, they dominate the supply of rare earths – elements required to produce anything from highly heat-resistant jet engines to Apple’s latest headphones.
What Wargaming Shows
In 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” simulating the scenario where China decides to invade Taiwan and the U.S. and its allies intervene militarily. Although this ignores more probable courses of action, such as a naval blockade, the exercise illustrates the likely Chinese playbook in the event of military offensive.
According to the wargame, China would need roughly 30 days to prepare its invasion forces, with U.S. intelligence detecting hostile intent about two weeks into their preparations. The operation would open with an intense missile and artillery bombardment of Taiwanese command centers, military instillations, and infrastructure. Simultaneously, the Chinese navy would maneuver to the eastern coast of Taiwan to seal off the island from Pacific supply lines while countering enemy missiles as they enter or exit the area of operation.
Once the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force establishes air superiority, amphibious landings and airborne assaults would begin. Despite the ability of paratroopers to seize key chokepoints behind enemy lines, the bulk of Chinese forces would still need to cross the Taiwan Strait and secure contested beachheads. The operation hinges on rapidly deploying large numbers of troops and vehicles; difficulties in reaching beaches and unloading assets could seriously undermine China’s offensive tempo, endangering the success of the entire operation.
China’s Reliance on the Ground Game
Just like a football coaches – hopefully better than Mark Stoops as of late – strategic thinkers in the military have to make important decisions on where to concentrate offensive and defensive assets. For China’s offense, think of their scheme as a redzone package. The opening missile and artillery barrages operate as a lethal offensive lineman, pancaking vital defensive players shortly after the snap.
Meanwhile, PLA air assets are wide receivers blocking and running deceptive routes designed to incapacitate the secondary, the last line of defense between the ball carrier and the endzone. In this analogy, Chinese naval assets closely reassemble a coaching staff watching from heights of the stadium. Functioning as both the offensive and defensive coordinators, decision-makers located on ships oscillating east of Taiwan operate as informational nodes, disseminating intelligence to thwart opponents from achieving their objectives.
As shown in the CSIS wargame, China’s offensive success is largely dependent on the run game. More specifically, moving thousands of troops across the Taiwan strait to secure beachheads and vital inland airfields. As a result, defensive schemes from Taiwan and its teammates are focused on stuffing the Chinese offense at the line of scrimmage, the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan’s costal defense has sophisticated batteries of anti-ship missiles, including U.S. made Harpoons, capable of sinking ships miles from the coastline. These missile systems are supplemented by more conventional platforms such as artillery and lighter munitions, which can accurately strike landing craft as they get closer to the island.
Like every other team though, Taiwan is looking for their X factor. In this case, drones and loitering munitions could be the heavy hitting linebacker they’re looking for. Taiwan has invested extensive research into unmanned surface vessels – medium sized ships which operate autonomously or remotely with the capabilities to gather intelligence, incapacitate enemy ships, and as a last resort sacrifice themselves to stop the enemy.
Additional unmanned systems in the air will help Taiwan thwart an attack. Platforms like the American made Switchblade and domestically produced Kamikaze Drone allow Taiwanese forces to deploy drones which function as both sensors and strike vehicles. Therefore, allowing ground and naval forces to damage or destroy enemy vehicles that slip through larger defense networks like anti-ship missiles and artillery. In this sense, the use of drones works to enhance Taiwan’s “defense in depth” – layering protective frameworks in the same way a defense lines up on the gridiron.
As Taiwan continues to approach defense procurement in a similar fashion to fringe SEC teams in the NIL era, it’s gearing up to achieve a massive underdog upset. However, the question remains. Will Taiwan’s flexible asymmetric scheme stand the test of China’s jumbo package?
Leave a Reply